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We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced
by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the
cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties
with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average
hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the
reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide
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Abstract: We implement an empirical test
for selection into health insurance using changes
in coverage induced by the introduction of man-
dated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our
test examines changes in the cost of the newly
insured relative to those who were insured prior
to the reform. We ﬁnd that counties with larger
increases in insurance coverage over the reform
period face the smallest increase in average hos-
pital costs for the insured population, consistent
with adverse selection into insurance before the
reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-
state variation and data on health measures, pro-
vide further evidence for adverse selection.
1 Introduction
Approximately 49.9 million people in the United
States lack health insurance (DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor and Smith (2011)). One potential driver
of uninsurance is asymmetric information on
health risk between insurers and the insured.
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Asymmetric information can distort available in-
surance contracts, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), or it can raise premiums for the relatively
healthy, as in Akerlof (1970). Both distortions
result in ineﬃciently low levels of insurance cov-
erage.
Predicated, at least in part, on concerns about
adverse selection, the state of Massachusetts
passed health reform in April 2006 aimed at
achieving near-universal health insurance cover-
age. The Massachusetts approach is considered
a model for national health reform, the Patient
Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act (PPACA),
signed in March 2010. A central feature of
both reforms is a mandate that individuals ob-
tain health insurance or pay a penalty. The
Massachusetts mandate allows us to examine
whether there was adverse selection into health
insurance before the reform. In contrast, existing
literature generally examines adverse selection
among employer-sponsored plans (e.g. Cutler
and Reber (1998); Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen
(2010)), which is less relevant for policy.
Our simple empirical methodology is based on
the observation that the direction of selection de-
pends on the diﬀerence between the cost of the
marginal enrollee and the cost of those who al-
ready have insurance. If the cost of the marginal
enrollee is below the average cost of those who
are already insured, selection is adverse; if the
cost of the marginal enrollee is above the average
cost of those who are already insured, selection
1is advantageous. Therefore, as demonstrated by
Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010), the sign
of the slope of the average cost curve captures
selection.
We use the Massachusetts reform to provide
an exogenous shift in coverage that identiﬁes the
slope of the average cost curve. We ﬁnd that
counties with larger increases in coverage over
the reform period face the smallest increase in
average hospital costs for the insured population,
consistent with adverse selection into insurance
before reform. Additional results that incor-
porate cross-state variation and data on health
measures provide further evidence for adverse se-
lection.
2 Test for Selection
Our primary test for adverse selection relies on
county level variation in coverage. All Mas-
sachusetts counties reached near-universal insur-
ance coverage through the reform, but some
counties were more aﬀected by the reform than
others because of diﬀerent initial levels of cover-
age. We estimate the following model
Yct = α ∗ Ict + δt + µc + ￿ct (1)
where Yct measures average hospital costs per
insured inhabitant of county c in year t, and I
captures insurance coverage. δt and µc control
for ﬁxed eﬀects by year and county. We esti-
mate equation (1) via TSLS where the set of in-
struments is given by the interaction of a post-
reform indicator and county ﬁxed eﬀects, such
that county-speciﬁc changes in coverage over the
reform period are the only source of identifying
variation.
Under adverse selection, we expect α < 0: an
increase in insurance coverage improves the pool
of the insured risks and decreases the average
costs per insuree. Conversely, under advanta-
geous selection, the average cost of the insured
grows as the pool expands: α > 0. Our pri-
mary speciﬁcation focuses on hospital cost as the
dependent variable because asymmetric informa-
tion is important for insurance insofar as it trans-
lates into cost. Furthermore, we can observe the
universe of hospital costs in Massachusetts, and
hospital costs account for the majority of medi-
cal spending.
To understand the mechanisms behind our
cost results, we examine health measures and
behaviors. We estimate variants of equation
(1) where Y represents measures of the average
health of the insured. Depending on the correla-
tion between the health measures and cost, the
sign of α is a test for selection. If there is ad-
verse selection, we expect the rate of diabetes (a
health measure that should be positively corre-
lated with costs) to decline in the insured popu-
lation. In contrast, we expect the rate of regu-
lar exercise (a measure that should be negatively
correlated with costs) to grow. If health insur-
ance improves our measures of health, we will be
biased against ﬁnding adverse selection.
We can also test for adverse selection by
comparing Massachusetts to other states. We
re-estimate equation (1) replacing counties by
states. Our instrument for insurance coverage
is then the interaction of a post-reform indicator
and a Massachusetts indicator.
3 Data
3.1 Case Mix Data
We observe the universe of hospital discharges
before and after the reform in the Massachusetts
Case Mix Data from 2004 to 2009. The data pro-
vide information on insurance coverage for every
hospital discharge.1 The data also provide infor-
mation on the total charges for each discharge,
which we convert to costs using the HCUP cost-
to-charge ratio. We prefer costs to charges be-
cause charges reﬂect prices, and hospitals might
have changed their prices following reform. We
deﬂate hospital costs into 2011 dollars using the
1We only consider variation in coverage between the
insured and the uninsured, and not between diﬀerent in-
surance contracts. Thus, our underlying model of adverse
selection is consistent with Akerlof (1970).
2medical care consumer price index provided by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
We focus on hospital costs for nonelderly in-
sured patients aged 18-64. Using the patient zip
code, we aggregate hospital costs to the county-
year level. To estimate the average hospital costs
for all insured inhabitants, including those who
do not visit the hospital, we incorporate addi-
tional data. For pre-reform coverage levels, we
use the Small Area Health Insurance Estimates
(SAHIE) from 2005 by county. For post-reform
coverage levels, we use the 2008 and 2009 es-
timates from the American Community Survey
(ACS), which is based on a much larger sample
size than the SAHIE but is only available start-
ing in 2008. In all analyses, we drop the reform
implementation years 2006 and 2007. We use the
Census for county population estimates.
3.2 BRFSS Data
We complement the hospital cost data with
health measures from the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS). We use average
health measures for the insured population at the
state-year level from 2004-2005 and 2008-2010.
We rely on random sample selection into the
BRFSS, which allows us to compare health mea-
sures for the insured sample population directly,
eliminating the need to merge coverage and pop-
ulation estimates from additional sources. We do
not weight the average health measures or the
average insurance coverage of the sampled pop-
ulation. We drop Dukes and Nantucket counties
from all analyses because the BRFFS does not




We compute the average hospital costs and the
average insurance coverage by county for two pe-
riods: 2004-2005 and 2008-2009, and we plot the
diﬀerence in each measure between the two pe-
riods in Figure 1.
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The linear ﬁt weights counties by population
size. We see a pronounced negative relationship,
which suggests that counties that saw greater
increases in coverage faced smaller increases in
average costs per insured resident, consistent
with adverse selection.





t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 shows the corre-
sponding IV estimate. The coeﬃcient is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. If we assume that
equation (1) describes the average cost function,
we can interpret the point estimate as the aver-
age hospital expenditure of the insured popula-
tion as we move from no insurance to full insur-
ance. Moving from the ﬁrst (most expensive) en-
rollee to full insurance coverage reduces hospital
costs by approximately $2,250 (about 50% of the
2006 average premium for employer-sponsored
health insurance, according to KFF (2006)). To
translate this coeﬃcient into the observed change
3in average costs, we need an estimate of the
coverage increase. The ﬁrst stage regression re-
sults at the state level from the BRFFS suggest
that because of health reform, insurance cover-
age in Massachusetts increased by 5.5%.2 Scal-
ing the point estimate by the increase in cover-
age suggests that because of adverse selection,
health reform reduced the annual average hospi-
tal costs for the insured Massachusetts popula-
tion by about $124 (0.055 x $2,247) per person,
approximately 3% of the 2006 average premium
for employer-sponsored health insurance.
The second column of Table 1 presents results
from a county-year level OLS regression, which
uses cross-sectional variation in the pre-reform
period. The coeﬃcient estimate is positive, sug-
gesting that without the reform-induced varia-
tion diﬀerences across counties provide spurious
evidence for advantageous selection.
4.2 Health Measures and Behav-
iors
Table 2 displays the impact of reform on vari-
ous measures of health of the insured population
aged 18-64, using variation by state.
Table 2–Evidence by State
Coverage t statistic
Days Health Not Good -1.926∗∗∗ (-3.01)
Health Prevented Activity 1.492 ( 1.51)
Exercise 0.237∗∗∗ ( 4.46)
Disability -0.170∗∗∗ (-4.37)
Need Equipment -0.100∗∗∗ (-5.33)
Diabetes -0.0391∗∗ (-2.30)
Asthma -0.0428 (-1.65)
clustered at the state level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
See Table A1 for an explanation of the abbrevi-
ations. Signs of six of the seven health measures
are consistent with adverse selection, and ﬁve of
these are statistically signiﬁcant. Results at the
county level, reported in Table 3, are broadly
consistent: signs of six of the seven coeﬃcients
2This coverage increase is consistent with estimates
from other sources, reported in Kolstad and Kowalski
(2010).
suggest adverse selection, but they are not statis-
tically signiﬁcant, likely reﬂecting the small sam-
ple size at the county level in the BRFSS.
Table 3–Evidence by County
Coverage t statistic
Days Health Not Good -4.372 (-0.56)
Health Prevented Activity -10.28 (-0.75)
Exercise 0.282 ( 0.46)
Disability -0.808 (-1.77)
Need Equipment -0.129 (-0.91)
Diabetes -0.0534 (-0.19)
Asthma 0.360∗∗ ( 2.49)
clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5 Conclusion
Our results suggest that increased coverage due
to reform in Massachusetts lowered average hos-
pital costs for the insured, and thus average
premiums before loading, by about $124. This
impact, which represents an average premium
change over all types of insurance, is consistent
with the aggregate change in premiums in Mas-
sachusetts. Between 2006 and 2009, premiums in
employer-sponsored plans followed the national
trend, but premiums in the non-group market
decreased by 20% (Gruber (2011)), comparable
to the 3% overall decrease in premiums that we
observe.
Our results also shed light on an important
question for insurers and policy makers facing
the introduction of the PPACA: who is likely to
sign up for coverage, particularly through new
health insurance exchanges? However, to gen-
eralize our results from the Massachusetts to
the national reform, we should note that Mas-
sachusetts had “community rating” regulations
that limited the ability of insurers to price based
on health status in the non-group health insur-
ance market before the reform. These regula-
tions could have increased asymmetric informa-
tion, leading to adverse selection and higher pre-
miums. In contrast, much of the country does
not currently have community rating regulations
in place, but the PPACA institutes them along
with the individual mandate.
4Despite diﬀerences in the community rating
environments between Massachusetts and the
nation, our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with
the CBO predictions for national reform: pre-
mium changes from -1 to 2% in the small group
market and from -3 to 0% in the large group
market (CBO 2009). Comparison with the CBO
estimates suggests that community rating in the
non-group market does not drive our results, un-
surprising given that only 5% of the insured in
Massachusetts were in the non-group market be-
fore reform and the share was unchanged after
reform (Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)).
The existence of community rating prior to re-
form also makes the Massachusetts experience
relevant in the case that the Supreme Court ﬁnds
the individual mandate unconstitutional but up-
holds the community rating regulations. Our re-
sults suggest that a partial implementation of
PPACA would reduce pooling, leading premiums
to fall by less than they otherwise would or even
increase.
We have demonstrated that there was adverse
selection into health insurance in Massachusetts
before the reform. While this allows us to ad-
dress some policy relevant questions, our sim-
ple sign test does not quantify the magnitude of
the welfare cost of adverse selection. In ongoing
work we extend this approach to estimate welfare
losses due to adverse selection.
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5Table A1–Questions from BRFFS
Days not good Now thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness and
injury, for how many days during the past 30 days was your physical health
not good?
Prevented Activity During the past 30 days, for about how many days did poor physical or mental
health keep you from doing your usual activities, such as self-care, work, or
recreation?
Exercise During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any
physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or
walking for exercise?
Disability During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any
physical activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or
walking for exercise?
Equipment Do you now have any health problem that requires you to use special equipment,
such as a cane, a wheelchair, a special bed, or a special telephone?
Diabetes Have you ever been told by a doctor that you have diabetes?
Asthma Have you ever been told by a doctor, nurse, or other health professional that
you had asthma?
6